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SECONDARY REFLECTION AS
INTERPRETATION*
In a note of January 7, 1914, in the beginning of his
Metaphysical Journal, Gabriel Marcel writes that "the problems by
which I am preoccupied at present are for the most part problems of
method."1 At the time he was intent on "avoiding both realism and
pure subjectivism," in working out aspace for religious faith. Many
years later, in reflecting back upon his efforts, Marcel offered this
assessment:
In rereading these already dated texts, I have the feeling that I
was nonetheless still dominated at that time by the spirit 01
abstraction I have never ceased fighting sinc~ then, and
indeed even then I was tempted to recognize the limits 01
idealism. All the same, it was as an idealist that I was
speaking.2
One of his idealist assumptions regarded his lack of appreciation for
"the immediate." "From the standpoint of immediate existence
nothing can be explained or even understood. "(MJ, 1) Empiricism,
as a philosophy of the immediate, is self-destructive. nThe immediate
is the very reverse of the principle of intelligibility." (MJ, 1) Knowledge
is not given in realistic fashion, through a process of the mind
receiving cont~nt from immediate experience because "Thought
cannot really have an internal content unless it gives it to itself, that is
to say, unless it mediates that which is given to it as external...." (MJ,
113) Reflection brings general conditions of intelligibility to bear on
the imm~diate, constituting the immediate into "objectivity," rendering
a coupling between existence and objectivity to account for
•For Robert Lechner
1Metaphysical Journal. tr., Bernard Wall (Chicago: Regnery, 1952).
Hereafter MJ.
2"Reply to Pietro Prini," in The Philosophy 01 Gabriel MarceI, ed.
Schilpp and Hahn (LaSalle, 111.: Open Court, 1984), p.240.
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intelligibility. The proper mode of an intelligible object is "spatialll or
ideal. The notion of truth follows upon intelligibility: "to speak of truth
regarding what is outside of existence is a contradiction in terms.1I (MJ,
29) With this understanding of intelligibility in place, Marcel attempts to
make room for faith by posing several aporias. How can the mind arise
to an awareness of its functioning (its limits) if its knowledge is solely
defined by its categories?How can non-temporal and necessary
philosophical claims about the functioning of the mind be reconciled
with the categorical functioning of the mind, which is ternporally
bound? Any solution to these difficulties, according to Marcel, pushes
one beyond the level of existential, categorical, intelligibility.
Marcel, to his credit, kept pushing and questioning his own
analyses until the reader soon senses a dramatic change of tone in
the Metaphysical Journal. In an entry of May 1, 1920, he
acknowledges his lIevolution in the direction of realism,1I and also that
he "cannot see exactly where it is heading. 1I (MJ, 238) What pushed
him in his "realistic" direction was his probing of ·participant
experience" over against the sense of the "general conditions of
intelligibllity," which formerly defined intelligibility. Marcel noted that
body as it is lived affectively, mybody, is not at all intelligible in terms of
the general conditions of objectivity. The level of existence is one of
immediate participation wherein the subject/object categories
subtending idealism are out of place. Objectification by reflection
would not render, as Marcel previously held, existence to be
intelligible, but would rather distort something that by its nature is
resistent to objective analysis. He finally admitted in a note of February
2, 1922 that he has reached the point where he must "effeet a radical
dissociation between the ideas of existence and objectivity." (MJ,
281)
Being and Having,3 'lhe continuation of his journal entries
from 1928·33 and his essay II0n the Ontological Mysteryll (1933),4
carried on Marcells struggle with problems of method, culminating in
his notions of problem/metaproblem, primary/ secondary reflection,
3Being and Having, tr. Katherine Farrer. (New York: Harper and Row.
1965). Hereafter BH.
4Gabriel Marcei, "On the Ontological Mystery," in The Philosophy of
Existentialism. tr.. Manya Harari (New York: Citadel. 1961). Hereafter OM.
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blindfold intuition. The intelligibility of a metaproblem involves onels
personal participation, whereas the intelligibility of a problem is
extrinsic to the investigator. Primary reflection is the impersonal
analysis correlative to problems, while secondary reflection, "the high
instrument" of philosophy, is correlative to the metaproblematic. The
challenge of secondary reflection is to think participation without
transforming it into objective deformation. It is crucial· to note that
Marcel adamantly rejects the identification of the metaproblematic wi'lh
the unknowable: "We must carefully avoid all confusion between the
metaproblematicand the unknowable....The recognition of the
metaproblematic...is an essentially positive act of the mind." (BH, 118)
The great difficulty which besets Marcel's philosophy lies in
explicating the "essentially positiveIl element in his definition of
secondary reflection. One could say that his whole philosophy
depends on validating this element.
Pursuing his IIrealistic" tendencies in Being and Having,
Marcel writes that "the possibility of the realist definition of truth is
implied in the nature of thought. Thought turns toward the Other, it is
the pursuit of the Other.n (BH, 30) Yet it is clear that the original
contact with this Other takes place on the level of an immediate
participation which itself cannot be defined as a knowledge. It is here
that Marcel introduces his notion of "intuition': -It seems to me that I
am bound to admit that I am· anyway on one level of myself - face to
face with Being. In a sense I see it. In another sense I cannot say that I
see it since I cannot grasp myself in the act of seeing it. The intuition is
not, and cannot be, directly reflected in consciousness. l' (BH, 98)
Secondary reflection is defined as "a thinking which stretches out
towards the recovery of an intuition which otherwise loses itself in
proportion as it is exercised....(Secondary reflection) is a recovery,
,but only in so far as it remains the tributary of what I have calied a
blindfold intuition. II (BH,118; 121)
Marcel's realistic tendency, his grounding of knowledge in
Being ["...knowledge is contingent on a participation in Being for
which no epistemology can account because it continually
presupposes it." (OM, 18)] has moved a commentator such as
Francisco Peccorini to identify Marcel's realism with that of
Aristotle's.Peccorini claims that "the nature of the famous blind
intuition is ...presented as being no more than the self-
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consciousness of the soul insofar as the latter is aware of her power to
know and become everything that is knowable."5 Marcel's realism is
depicted by Peccorini as one of "common sense immediate realism."
The difficulty with this reading is that it neglects the fact that Marcel
himself refers constantly to secondary reffection as Nrecollection" and
that he places himself in the Platonic tradition. 6 Marcel's realism of the
blindfold intuition grounds reflection in experience, which, to
reiterate, is not itself knowledge: "AII thought transcends the
immediate. The pure immediate excludes thought. ... But this
transcendence implies a magnitude and even a leleology." (BH, 38;
emphasis added) Reflection feeds off of (is a "tributary" of) participant
experience, which guides it. The IIrecovery" of the immediate is never
itself depicted as immediate realism by Marcel. In fact he goes to great
pains to convince us of the indirect character of an affirmation or
articulation of experience.
Let us admit #lat Being has first laid a sort of siege to the seit;
by self 1mean the subject who affirms. This subject none the
less intervenes between being and the affirmation, in the role
of a mediator. And then the problem arises which I observed in
my notes of January the 19th, for I am inevitably led to ask
which is 'the ontological standing of this seit in relation to the
being which besieges hirn. Is he whelmed in it, or does he on
the contrary have some sort of command over it? (BH, pp. 140-
41: emphasis added)
Thus Marcel's realism, regarding any knowledge of experience,
is not direct or naive: "The intuition is not, and cannot be,directfy
reflected in consciousness.· (BH, 98) The subject is the nexus
between the insertion in being and the assertion of being. This very
break between being and its affirmation is the place where Paul
5Francisco Peccorini, "Marcel's 'Blind Intuition' as Man's 'Ontological
Foundations'," in Contributions of Gabriel Marcel to Philosophy, ed. William
Cooney (Lewiston, New York: Edwin Meilen Press, 1989), p. 87.
6Cf. "On the Ontological Mystery." for numerous identifications of
secondary re'flection and recollection. Cf. the "avant propos" of the French
edition of The Mystery of Being, Vol. I where Marcel identifies the Iife of
reflection as une veritable anamnese, and claims for his work the label
neosocratisme.
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Rieoeur, one of Mareel's finest and most appreeiative eommentators,
raises his major eritieism of Mareel. Perhaps a passage from ·On the
Ontologieal Mystery" will point out the souree of Ricoeur's
uneasiness. Mareel writes that the metaproblematieal "takes plaee
. within an affirmation whieh I am rather than an affirmation whieh lutter;
by uttering it I break it, I divide it, I am on the point of betraying it." (OM,
18) This is not an untypical passage, one whieh warns of the distortive
potential of artieulation. Rieoeur is eoneerned that Mareel's eritique of
primary refleetion • instrumental reason, teehnique, ealeulation - has
led hirn to rejeet reason entirely: "Without denying that this is indeed
the present condition of reason, I do not see how one ean
understand the ontologieal affirmation without at the same time
undertaking a deliveranee of reason from its seientieo-teehnologieal
abasement. "7 In other words, Mareel seems to Rieoeur to use
seeondary re'fleetion as a via negativa: the body is not a tool,
sensation is not eommunieation, the Other is not an objeet, ete.,
without rehabilitating reason in a way to positively explicate and argue
about experienee. To Rieoeur, Mareel's eritieism of reason has
pushed hirn in a mystieal direetion, despite his best intentions. One
might say that Rieoeur's own philosophy has taken up this ehallenge
of rehabiliting seeondary refleetion.
Rieoeur is right to the extent that Mareel more often than not
employs seeondary refleetion as eritique. However, there are times
when Mareel uses secondary refleetion positively, eonstructively, and
in ways that prefigure Rieoeur's own projeet. One of these ways ean
be found in Mareel's views about the relationship between art,
philosophy and life, particularly his use of drama to fietionally portray
life. But perhaps the way that is elosest to Rieoeur's own work is
Mareel's treatment of narrative.
In the ehapter "My Life," of the first volume of The Mystery of
Being~8 Mareel takes up the question of self-knowedge. He rejects
the idea of "an objectively valid answer· to the question "Who am I?".
7paul Ricoeur, "Gabriel Marcel and Phenomenology," in The
Philosophy of Gabriel MarceI, p. 490.
BThe Mystery of Being, Val. I, trI G.S. Fraser (Chicago: Regnery,
1960). Hereafter MB 1.
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While reflection affords a eertain Ildetachmentil in regard to life, it fails
to produce a 'Ipure subject'l who has an unsituated knowledge. He
draws an analogy between recollecting life and making artistic
judgements:
...everything seerns to indicate that it would be risky to the last
degree to seek, in the judgements of men at some given time,
for the definitive and irrevocable: for our appreciations of a
work of art are always, say what we will to the contrary,
affected by the 'cUmate of the age,' they reflect the
unconscious general assumptions which we share with our
contemporaries during soine given period in history; the
historically conditioned attitude is sornething which, for aU of
US, is quite inescapable; and perhaps we cannot even imagine,
without tangling ourselves in contradictions, a dehistoricized
attitude in the name of which completely objective judgments,
judgments quite untainted by the local, the temporal, the
personal, and in a word quite free from relativity, could be
made about works of art, literature, and philosophy. (MB I,
196-97)
The positive feature of recollection which Marcel introduees is the
nation of understanding onels life as a narrative.
My lifa presents itself to reflection as something whose
essential nature is that it can be related as a story...and this is
so very true that one rnay be permitted- to wonder whether the
words Imy life' retain any precise meaning at all, if we abstract
from the meaning we attach to them any reference whatsoever
to the act of narration. (MB I, 190)
The relation of narrative to life is not realistic for lIit is impossible...tor
me to tell the story of my life just as 1have lived it.1I (MB I, 191) One
does not IImirror oneselfll through narrative. Narrative presents life lias
a sequence of episodes along the tine of timeIl (MB I, 191), but the
sequence is I'selectivetl and is allsummary," and not a documentary
IIreproduction.1I IIlmagination ll enters into the constructive
dimensionof narration, a putting into shape of life in terms of
meaningful episodes. The constructivist dimension C'a fresh
construction of an old sitell) recognizes that IImy life, as it has really
been lived, falls outside my thinkingls present grasp:1 (MB I, 191)
Narrative, however, is not sheer construction imposed willy-nilly upon
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the pure immediacy of life, because narrative, for Marcei, makes
"allusion to something which, of its very nature, will not let itself be
fully expressed in words, and which is something I have lived
through. 1I (MB I, 193) Narrative, can awaken "an echo, set eertain
strings vibrating" (MB I, 193) by a "luminous flash. 1I The referenee to
IIlight" in his later works is meant to cover what he used to call the
blinded intuition: IIWe cannot, I think, ...capture (being itself) or seize
it, any more than we ean see the souree giving off light. I think that this
eomparison between being and light is a fundamental one.1I9 VVhile
the immediate IIwili not let itself be fully expressed in w()rdsll
(emphasis added), a eertain degree of adequacy is possible.
Mareel comes to see the positive dimension of seeondary
reflection most elearly in arte Here thinking and understanding are
elearly interpretive. Just as a writer's work is not its IIgrossly material
naturell (MB I, 195), but a souree to draw life from "by opening
ourselves to it and interpreting it for ourselves," so one's life does not
consist of material effeets of an objective nature. That is why narrative
is necessary. Narrative is an instanee wherein language, utterance,
expression are not of themselves distortive of experienee. While not
reproducing experience, they can lIimage" it. In turn the expressions
of experienee call to one another for recognition and eonfirmation,
offering an alternative mode of universality and verification: 11 ••.in art
sujectivity tend$ to pass over into an intersubjectivity whieh is entirely
different from 'lhe objectivity science honors so much, but which
nonetheless eompletely surpasses the limits of the individual
eonseiousness taken in isolation." (TWB, 6)
Marcel's use of narrative as a· construction "nourished" by
partieipant experience is an example of a positive use of secondary
refleetion. In this instanee, refleetion is clearly lIinterpretation.1I The
emphasis upon thusly "elaborated" experiences and their dialogieal
intelligiblilty and verification proffers the notion of a universality which
.is indeed arehabilitation of reason as against the third person
processes of objective thought. Not only does this interpretive turn in
Marcel's thought lead to a more positive notion of secondary
reflection and the fraternal character of philosophy, but it leads him
9Tragic Wisdam and Beyand, tr. JoUn and McCormlck (Evanstonl, 111.:
Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 14. Hereafter TWB.
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also to unequivocally side with a democratic politics. 10 While these
notions are not highly developed in his work, nonetheless, in both of
these ways Marcel can be seen to prefigure the work of Ricoeur.
Villanova University THOMAS W. BUSCH
10Cf. "The Responsibility of the Philosopher in Today's World", in
TWB.
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